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Abstract 
 
Since the shinkansen services started in 1964, Japan has been seen as being the leading country in 
the provision of high speed inter-city railway services. Britain, on the other hand, it is generally felt, 
has gone through a period of steady decline, with the steam locomotive Mallard’s speed record 
standing for much of the post-war period, and still being one of the highest speeds recorded in the 
country. At the start of a new century, as the demands of an ever faster world, which continues to at 
the same time become increasingly concerned about energy consumption and environmental 
pollution, it seems appropriate to analyse what the real state of high-speed railways are in these two 
countries. 
 
The word ‘real’ is of particular significance. For the focus of much of my research on the shinkansen 
is on the symbolism of it and the fact that little is actually known about the facts surrounding its 
development – both in terms of the routes chosen and the technological developments. Although 
Japanologists are aware that certain routes and stations were chosen as much due to the power of 
specific politicians rather than for economic reasons, this is not widely known outside Japan. Indeed, 
stories about the shinkansen in the UK are often as misinformed as other stories on Japan, though 
what is significant is that the stories tend to paint an overly positive picture. The shinkansen has 
become the Holy Grail of high-speed railways. If a true analysis and comparison is to be done, it is 
essential that such misinformation is got away with. 
 
The common perception is that the UK has much to learn from the shinkansen and little to offer in 
return. How different things are since Britain introduced the first railways to Japan in the nineteenth 
century. However, as unlikely as it seems in the light of recent train disasters and other problems 
within the British rail industry, perhaps there are still things that Japan could learn from Britain.  
 
This paper will aim to address these various points – specifically to give information about the real 
state of the shinkansen and to suggest what can be learnt by both countries. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the facts about the high speed railway network in Japan and 
what can be learnt from it. This second aspect will be done particularly from the viewpoint of British 
railways, though many points are likely to be as valuable for other countries, including those that 
already operate high speed railways. This article will attempt to demystify the Japanese high speed 
railways, for although much is assumed about their operation, as with so many matters relating to 
Japan, some of this is based as much upon stereotypes, myth and misinformation as it is upon fact. 
 
Although the title of this paper includes the phrase ‘high speed railways in Japan and the UK’, due to 
various limitations, some of which will become clearer below,  it is not possible to do a thorough 
comparison of high speed railways in both Japan and the UK and so this paper concentrates on the 
situation in Japan.  
 
This article is primarily based on the research I have done to date on high speed railways in Japan. 
So far this incorporates two research trips to Japan –  in January 2001 (when I spent three days with 
Central Japan Railway Company) and April 2001, interviews with various people connected to the 
railway industry in Japan, reading available materials on the topic, information gained from a well-
informed e-mail discussion group about Japanese trains, and personal observations from extensive 
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use of Japanese railways over the past twelve years that I have been going to Japan. More 
information about this is given below. 
 
At this point I would like to thank the help and support of all those involved in the development of 
this paper and my research to date, in particular the Central Japan Railway Company, Japan 
Technical Research Institute (JTRI), former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, and the Gotoh 
family. I would also like to thank the Anglo-Japanese Academy for providing me with the 
opportunity to develop this paper. 
 
This paper begins with some background information about my methodology and research strategy, 
including a small literature review. After that there is some background and historical information 
about the high speed railways in Japan. The final part looks at the significance of them and begins to 
look at the question of what Britain can learn from Japan, and also in what areas, if any, Britain may 
have things to teach Japan. 
 
 
Background 
 
I first travelled to and around Japan in July 1989 – the first year of the Heisei period. My first trip 
was four weeks long and although I have many happy memories of the people and places that I 
visited, the journey from Tokyo to Osaka was perhaps the one thing that I had looked forward to 
most. Like many foreigners, when one thinks of Japan, the image that in conjured up is of Mount 
Fuji with a passing shinkansen. However, there are still few that actually get to experience this. As I 
walked on to the platform on that hot summer’s morning with two of my Japanese friends, I 
remember the anticipation of seeing this great symbol of Japan. Although one of them had 
specifically booked me on this particular train as it was a new model, coming face-to-face with this 
sharper design than the one that I had seen in pictures, made the train appear even greater. The 
journey itself, like most shinkansen journeys I have subsequently taken, was uneventful (barely even 
managing to see Mount Fuji), but relaxing and undoubtedly faster than what I was used to in Britain. 
 
Since that first journey and going on to study Japanese studies at the University of Sheffield, I have 
always wanted to learn more about these trains. On two occasions I have come close to formally 
studying them – though both times circumstances meant that I went in another direction (first to 
study the creation of the J.League and Japan’s bid for the 2002 World Cup for my undergraduate 
dissertation, and then when I chose to study education reform for my doctoral thesis having just 
completed a year on the JET Programme). Having completed my doctorate and updated this into a 
book (Hood 2001a), I was ready to embark upon my next piece of research, and I quickly decided to 
get back to my roots and study the shinkansen.  
 
Some people have suggested that this change in focus is a big leap, but I tend to see it more as a 
natural progression, or rather reversion, to what interests me about Japan. On top of this, the focus of 
my research on the shinkansen also means that there is not as great a gap between my present and 
previous research as some may assume. For although the topic of my research is the shinkansen, the 
technical and engineering aspects of it make up only one small part of the focus of my research. 
Indeed, my starting point was the idea that the shinkansen – with the image mentioned above – was 
the symbol of modern Japan, and I wanted to investigate the validity of this idea, how this situation 
had arisen, and the significance of it. Naturally knowledge of the technical side of the shinkansen is 
also necessary, but the link to my former research was made very clear by a Central Japan Railway 
Company employee who commented on the fact that the shinkansen would not work in the UK as 
the training and education of railway personnel in the UK was not good enough.
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1 Comments made during my research trip in January 2001. Due to the nature of the comments, I have decided that it 
is best for the person to remain anonymous. 
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Although I am not an engineer, the technical information continues to interest me and helps to bind 
my research together. Furthermore, I am all too aware that it is this part of my research that it is of 
interest to others, as they search for answers to the question of how to improve the British railways. 
This search was clearly demonstrated by the turnout and comments made at a presentation I made at 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs in January 2001 (Biting The Bullet: What We Can Learn 
From the Shinkansen).
2
 My research comes at a time when many in Britain are doing a lot of soul 
searching as a result of continued problems, including fatal accidents, on the British railways. The 
shinkansen appears to be perceived as the Holy Grail of high speed railways. This of course relates 
back to the other part of my research on the shinkansen – the symbolism of it and image that it 
projects. 
 
It is not uncommon for a major incident on a British railway to be followed by an article in the 
British press looking at the shinkansen. However, although those of us in Japanese studies are used 
to many articles, particularly in the more populist media, having errors in their reporting of Japan, it 
is unusual for these errors to either overstate Japan’s position or to be highly positive. In this respect, 
the shinkansen is certainly unusual, if not unique. This situation is not limited to the printed media, 
however. In the past year there has been an advert on television for Anadin (headache pills), which 
begins with the words ‘trains travelling at 300 miles per hour’. The picture shows a shinkansen. 
Although it is uncertain that people would immediately recognise this train as a shinkansen – as 
Mount Fuji does not appear in the background and it is not the round-fronted design that most 
associate with Japan – the fact that it is obviously not a Eurostar or TGV, would probably lead many 
to conclude that it was Japanese. However, this model of shinkansen cannot even do 300 km/h (187 
mph), let alone 480 km/h! 
 
Despite the apparent interest in the shinkansen, there is surprisingly little literature on the subject. 
Peter Semmens’s book High Speed in Japan: Shinkansen – The World’s Busiest High-Speed 
Railway (1997, second edition in 2000) is the only English-language book specifically about the 
shinkansen. Although it contains a lot of useful information, I think it is fair to say that more work 
went into the original edition than the up-dated one, and so the data presented in the latter one 
appears incomplete. Other English-language books that include useful detailed information on 
aspects of the shinkansen are Aoki’s A History of Japanese Railways (2000), The Privatisation of 
Japanese National Railways by Ishikawa and Imashiro (1998), and Success Story by Sumita (2000). 
All these books have their strengths and their weaknesses, and the aim of my own research is to 
bring the strengths together, with my own primary research, into a comprehensive up-to-date study 
of the shinkansen. A further book, Bullet Trains (Solomon 2001), has recently come out. This book 
is interesting in that the front cover has a picture of an original style shinkansen, but the book also 
includes chapters on high speed trains in countries other than Japan under the banner of ‘bullet 
trains’. 
 
Although there may not be a great number of books in English, there is no shortage of other 
resources. To begin with, I do not have a problem using Japanese material, and Suda’s Tōkaidō 
Shinkansen (2000) is particularly informative, although it, like many other studies, tends to 
concentrate on the Tōkaidō line while largely overlooking the rest of the shinkansen network. 
However, there are many other resources. As already mentioned I have been fortunate enough to 
have been hosted by Central Japan Railway Company (hereafter referred to as JR Tōkai, as it is more 
commonly known in Japan) and JTRI, who provided a great deal of information – both printed and 
through interviews. I was also able to make observations on a number of aspects of the shinkansen 
and railway companies which are not normally seen by passengers, for example. I have also 
managed to find a limited number of articles about shinkansen on the internet, both in English and 
Japanese, though their focus tends to be very narrow and not always as helpful as the title suggests. 
There is one other great resource – the rail enthusiasts. There are around 200 members of the Japan 
Railway Society (based in the UK), which has a publication, Bullet-In. On top of this there are 
                                                        
2 An updated version of this paper is Hood 2001b. 
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numerous websites, bulletin-boards and even a new English language e-mail discussion group 
(jtrains@yahoo.com). Hidden within these, enthusiasts are some extremely well-informed people 
that have a wealth of information, seemingly available for immediate access. 
 
The problem with any of this information is assessing its reliability. It is natural to be careful with 
information provided by a rail company, for example, as they have a corporate image to protect, and 
so only certain information is ever likely to be forthcoming. However, even the enthusiasts and 
‘independent authors’, such as Peter Semmens, may have a tendency to ignore or overlook any 
negative aspects of the shinkansen due their enthusiasm for the shinkansen or out of respect to those 
that have provided them with the information. This is, of course, a problem that I too could face and 
I have written before about the sorts of problems that social scientists have to be aware of when 
researching Japan (see Hood 2001a). Space limitations mean that it is not practical to dwell on this 
point and how to deal with it here. 
 
As my main research is mostly a study of the shinkansen, there has not been much need to study 
British railways. As a consequence most information provided in this paper on British railways, 
therefore, is based on general knowledge and experience. However, where necessary, this is 
supplemented by information gathered from various sources, such as internet sites and books, 
including the aforementioned Bullet Trains as well as Planning Passenger Railways by Harris and 
Godward (eds). 
 
Finally, it should be noted that although the comparison is made between the shinkansen and high 
speed trains in Britain, I personally do not believe such a comparison is truly valid as British ‘high 
speed’ trains, as things stand, better resemble the service provided by ‘limited express’ (tokkyū) 
trains on most JR (Japan Railways) lines. However, as it is a reliable ‘high speed’ service to which 
many British companies aspire, the comparison with and study of the shinkansen is worthwhile. 
 
 
Background of the Shinkansen 
 
Having set out some of the background to how this research is being conducted, it is now time to 
look in more detail at the shinkansen itself. In this section, I will introduce some of the historical and 
technical information which will help in developing the final part of this paper. 
 
The shinkansen first started in 1964 in time for the Tokyo Olympics. However, its original concept 
dated back to the Pacific War, when a ‘bullet train’ (dangan ressha) was planned between Tokyo 
and Shimonoseki (from where people and freight – as there were also to be freight trains – could be 
ferried to the continent) to improve the link between the capital and the expanding empire. As the 
war began to turn against Japan, so the project was abandoned, but not before some of the land had 
been bought and some of the significant tunnels had been built. Both of these factors helped speed 
up the building of the shinkansen when the plan was resurrected in the 1950s (Suda 2000: 22-34; 
Hosokawa 1997: 192; interviews with JR Tōkai officials). 
 
The word shinkansen itself refers to the line – literally ‘new main line’ – yet it has also become to 
refer to the trains as well. For the most part shinkansen are dedicated tracks and they are wider than 
the standard Japanese gauge, but the same width as a standard (British) gauge. Despite this the 
carriages, are significantly wider, allowing for 3+2 seats in standard accommodation and 2+2 in 
‘green cars’ (first class). This point was most clearly demonstrated when a shinkansen was taken to 
the National Railway Museum in York, and for the last part of the journey was put on the main East-
coast Mainline, where signals by the side of the line had to be moved due to the train’s extra width.
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3 Information taken from a BBC programme shown (in the North BBC TV region) on 12 July 2001 following the 
unveiling of the shinkansen at the National Railway Museum. 
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There are now six lines in operation. The original Tōkaidō line was extended to Okayama and then 
onto Hakata, with the Shin-Osaka to Hakata stretch – Sanyō shinkansen – becoming the second line. 
The Tōhoku and Jōetsu lines run north to Morioka (Hachinohe from Autumn 2002) and to Niigata. 
These lines initially started at Ōmiya (in present day Saitama city), but were later extended to Ueno 
and then to Tokyo station itself. The Hokuriku shinkansen runs from Tokyo to Nagano (though will 
also be extended) – although it covers the same track as the Jōetsu line as far as Takasaki. There are 
then two ‘mini shinkansen’ lines – the Yamagata shinkansen that runs from Fukushima (on the 
Tōhoku line) to Shinjo (originally to Yamagata, but later extended) and the Akita shinkansen that 
runs from Morioka to Akita. 
 
A significant moment in the history of the shinkansen occurred in 1987 when Japan National 
Railways (JNR) was privatised into six regional companies and one nationwide freight company.
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The Tōkaidō line was taken over by JR Tōkai; the Sanyō line was taken over by JR West, and the 
other lines (although the Hokuriku, Yamagata and Akita lines were not built until a later date) are all 
covered by JR East, the world’s largest railway company. 
 
Perhaps one of the most visible differences of the shinkansen in the private era has been the 
developments in the rolling stock. The original design – now referred to as 0 Series (one of which 
has now gone on display at the National Railway Museum in York) – was the only design for the 
first two decades. It was not until the 1980s that it was joined by the 100 Series (on the Tōkaidō and 
Sanyō lines) and the 200 series on the northern lines. These changes were largely cosmetic and did 
not greatly alter the performance of the trains (though it should be noted that the Sanyō and northern 
lines have different speed limits due to improvements in track development compared to the original 
Tōkaidō line). However, since the mid-1990s there have been a stream of new designs; the 300, 500 
and 700 series on the Tōkaidō and Sanyō lines, and the 400 series, E1, E2, E3, and E4 designs on the 
northern lines. Their shapes are different and each have evolved in some way – in the case of the 
Tōkaidō/Sanyō shinkansen, for example, the 500 series (owned by JR West) is the fastest train in 
operation at 300 km/h, whereas the 700 series (originally only used by JR Tōkai, but now also 
                                                        
4 The six regional companies are JR Hokkaidō, JR East, JR Central (‘JR Tōkai’), JR West, JR Shikoku and JR 
Kyūshū. 
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operated by JR West), although introduced later, has a lower top speed (285 km/h) but is more 
efficient and environmentally friendly (Semmens 2000). 
 
 
What to Learn from the Shinkansen 
 
Having looked at some of the background to the shinkansen we can now look at some of the points 
that are significant about them, with particular reference to the idea of trying to improve British 
railways. 
 
Although the overriding image of the shinkansen is one of speed – I feel it is more appropriate to 
start with the issue that, based on my observations to date, appears to be of the greatest concern to 
shinkansen operators, which is safety. Ever since the shinkansen first began it used the most 
advanced safety mechanisms available. The system is simple enough to understand. The track is 
divided into blocks. Only one train can occupy a block. The speed limit for each subsequent block 
behind a train gradually rises (depending on whether there are any other restrictions, such as sharp 
corners, etc.). A train cannot go faster than the limit for that block – if it tries, automatic braking 
procedures are applied. This system is referred to as ATC – Automatic Train Control. 
 
It should be noted at this point that shinkansen trains do not operate automatically. The driver has 
control and decides the operating speed. It is only if the limit is passed that the driver’s control is 
overridden. There can be no doubt that the Japanese driver is highly skilful – especially when one 
considers the punctuality of trains, as will be discussed below. The idea of a signal being passed 
while red (commonly known as a SPAD – Signal Passed At Danger – in Britain) is a totally alien 
concept to most Japanese drivers. The fact that it happens so frequently in the UK points to the lack 
of professionalism, the arrogance and the incompetence of railway operators in Britain (whether it be 
the driver for behaving like that, the train company for not training drivers better, the unions for the 
apparent unquestioning support of drivers much of the time on this issue, or the company that 
actually allows signals to be passed or be located where they are hard to see). One begins to 
appreciate the comment by the JR Tōkai official given above in this context. Some of these problems 
may have their roots, and as a consequence the need for a solution also, outside the railway industry 
– for example within the education system and society as a whole. After all, many do not think twice 
about jumping a red light in a car, and problems with poor service are becoming an unfortunately 
notorious part of British life. However, these areas are beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
Since the shinkansen began there have been no derailments. There have been no collisions between 
shinkansen. There have been no fatalities at all on the main shinkansen due to such accidents. It is 
true that there have been accidents on the ‘mini-shinkansen’ (for example, in January 2001, a car 
driver was killed after apparently becoming confused in snow at a level crossing – of which there are 
none on main shinkansen lines – and colliding with a Yamagata shinkansen), and there was also a 
fatality at Mishima station when a boy was dragged along the platform to his death after his arm was 
caught in the door. However, this should not detract from the fact that the overall safety performance 
of the shinkansen is exemplary. The companies are not resting on their laurels, however, as all the 
companies continue to highlight the problems of level-crossings on their local lines and ‘mini-
shinkansen’ (where appropriate), which is the most common reason for accidents on normal lines, 
and barriers and further surveillance cameras (many shinkansen are over 400 metres long, making 
visibility along platforms difficult) have been installed (for example, barriers such as those seen at 
Shin-Kobe and Shin-Yokohama where through trains run next to the platform edge will be installed 
at stations such as Kyoto where all trains stop). 
 
From my limited engineering knowledge – gained during the course of my research – the one slight 
concern is what would happen if a shinkansen was to derail. To date that has not been a problem, for 
example a collision on the Tōkaidō shinkansen between a shinkansen and maintenance vehicle did 
not cause a derailment in August 1993 (more details about the resulting chaos caused by this 
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accident are given below). However, I believe that incident occurred at a relatively low speed. What 
could potentially happen during a faster accident has been graphically demonstrated recently in the 
UK, with carriages scattered in many directions. The shinkansen use essentially the same system for 
bogies as British trains – with two sets for each carriage. This is different from those used on the 
French TGV (and Eurostar, for which the carriage design and manufacturer are the same), whereby 
one set of bogies overlaps between two carriages. The end effect is that the number of bogies for a 
train is nearly halved, and it is supposed to provide a smoother ride (not a significant problem on the 
shinkansen in my view) and has proved to help keep the train upright in case of a derailment or 
collision. However such differences are of course academic if the collisions can be avoided in the 
first place. 
 
One final point that should be made on the issue of safety is that the shinkansen was introduced 
when public confidence in JNR was extremely low. There had been several large accidents (both on 
the railways and with also on JNR operated, accounting for over 1,300 lives in three years 
(Hosokawa 1997: 152, 166)) and some politicians were trying to prevent the introduction of the 
shinkansen over fears about the number of fatalities there would be if such a high speed train were to 
crash. The fact that there have been no such incidents is not only testament to the great design of the 
shinkansen and its use by the various JR companies (as well as JNR in its day), but also should be a 
lesson to British railway companies; it is possible to create a new railway ethos from the background 
of disaster. 
 
With the use of dedicated tracks – something that is operated on many local lines also – the problems 
of following slower services or having trains crossing over tracks is greatly reduced. This not only 
improves safety, but also allows for greater speed. In Japan, speed is a consequence of safety as 
much as a goal in itself. When the service began in 1964 the journey time from Tokyo to Osaka was 
cut overnight to four hours from six and a half hours. The following year, after the track bed had 
settled, the times were cut by a further fifty minutes. The top speeds of the trains was an impressive 
210 km/h – the fastest in the world (the second fastest was the Mistral in France with 160 km/h 
though in 1964 it had a higher average speed than the shinkansen – the following year the 
shinkansen’s average was above the Mistral’s top speed!). Unsurprisingly the shinkansen’s 
performance was better than Britain’s 126 mph (203 km/h) which was set some twenty five years 
earlier by the Mallard, which had not since been improved on (the fastest operating service in 1964 
was the Bristolian with a top speed of a mere 145 km/h!) (Fossett 2001a) . Now, the fastest train in 
service is the 500 series which has a top speed of 300 km/h, and although the limit on the Tōkaidō 
line is 270 km/h both the 500 and 700 series can now travel between Tokyo and Osaka in two and a 
half hours. 
 
Trains do not operate at top speed for the whole journey – the Tōkaidō line in particular has 
problems due to the large number of trains operating on the line (up to 11 per hour at present, to be 
raised to 15 when Shinagawa-Shin terminal opens in 2003) and the environmental concerns (noise 
pollution in particular) as the trains pass through populated areas. There is some spare capacity in the 
timetable for late trains to make up time (a rare problem, as will be discussed below), but on the 
Tōkaidō line it is limited. On a trip in March 2000 I was fortunate to travel on a service to Okayama 
which had started from Tokyo 17 minutes late. The whole of the journey was spent trying to make 
up lost time – with the conductor making sincere apologies at each stop for any inconvenience 
caused by the delay. Although we had made up 6 minutes by the time we reached Shin-Osaka 
(approximately 550 km from Tokyo), we managed to arrive only around 1 minute late (for which 
there were still apologies) when we reached Okayama terminal only 180 km later.
5
 
 
                                                        
5  The distances printed in timetables tend to use the ‘operating’ distances rather than the real distances. The 
‘operating’ distances are slightly longer and helps raise some extra revenue due to part of the price of a ticket being 
based on distance travelled. For a more detailed account of this particular journey see Hood 2000. 
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This late running – and it should be noted that anything over one minute is officially declared late – 
is certainly rare. The average delay to the shinkansen is an impressive 0.4 minutes – even including 
delays caused by earthquakes, typhoons, and the like (about which there will be more discussed 
below) (Central Japan Railway Company 2000b: 7). In January 2001 I travelled in the cab of a 700 
series Nozomi service and was amazed at the accuracy of the train as demonstrated by a constant 
readout on one of the computer screens. For the most part the train was within 15 seconds of 
schedule, though as we passed official checkpoints (such as stations) the figure tended to read 0! The 
driver managed this with very subtle – to the point of being totally unnoticeable – adjustments to the 
speed over a great distance rather than sudden acceleration or braking as we approached the 
checkpoints.
6
 
 
Of course in order to run such an efficient and effective service requires maintenance. To help in this 
respect the shinkansen services all shut down at midnight and do not resume until six the following 
morning – allowing for six hours of maintenance every day. Although some major maintenance 
work was carried out in 1972 which lead to the lines being closed until midday, such drastic action 
has not been necessary since then (Suda 2000: 46). Part of the reason for this is the running of Dr 
Yellow – a special inspection shinkansen that runs along the length of the lines every month 
checking for any possible defects. I was fortunate enough to be one of the last guests to travel on the 
old Dr Yellow on the Tōkaidō line before it was replaced by a much newer (and faster) model in 
2001.
7
 There have been maintenance problems – the most notable being with the tunnels on the 
Sanyō shinkansen, but these were all quickly dealt with and did not cause the kind of disruption that 
has recently been seen in the UK with the replacement of worn-out track. Having said this, the 
condition of the line remains one of the chief concerns of one of the men, Nishio Gentarō, partly 
responsible for the design of the original shinkansen (Nishio, interview, April 2001). 
 
When Mr Nishio and his team began to design the shinkansen, the brief was simple – do what you 
want. It did not even matter whether the train was electric, diesel or even steam powered! What was 
important was to make the shinkansen a pleasurable experience. Windows were provided for all 
seats so that passengers would have a view (something that does not happen on many British trains 
or TGV/Eurostar). Seats were relatively spacious (and now have much greater leg room than what 
those who travel in the UK or on TGV/Eurostar would be used to) and can be turned round so that 
passengers can face the direction of travel or turn to face friends (though there is no table, which 
many British passengers apparently like). The train also looked good. The familiar round ‘bullet’ 
shape was inspired by an American train that Mr Nishio had seen when he had been to New York 
once, rather than being based on any particular aerodynamic principles. The round lights were 
actually an after thought – when he first enquired about their design he was told not to bother with 
them as it would not be possible to have lights that were strong enough to allow the driver to see the 
length of the train’s braking distance, and with no level crossings there was no need for other people 
to be able to see the train coming (Nishio, interview, April 2001). This fact was clearly demonstrated 
to me when I entered the cab one night on the old Dr Yellow (based on a 0 series) during my trip in 
January 2001. In the end the lights were added as it was felt that passengers would be apprehensive 
about travelling in the dark without them! (Nishio, interview, April 2001) 
 
Of course another key part of the shinkansen is the route. When the Tōkaidō line was planned, the 
initial idea was to only have station stops in Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto and Osaka (Nishio, 
interview, April 2001). However, political pressure – both from national politicians and more 
particularly from local communities – meant that additional stations were also constructed (most 
notably Gifu-Hashima). This outside persuasion has been a notable feature of the continued 
development of the shinkansen. The line to Niigata was in large part due to the efforts of Tanaka 
Kakuei, a former Prime Minister, who had envisaged the whole Japanese archipelago being linked 
by shinkansen and is well-known for his development of pork barrel politics in Japan. The route 
                                                        
6 For more information on this particular journey see Hood 2001c. 
7 For more information on this particular journey see Hood 2001c. 
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itself went through Takasaki, the home constituency of Nakasone Yasuhiro, who admitted that the 
two worked closely together to see the successful completion of the line (Nakasone, interview, April 
2001). The Tōkaidō/Sanyō shinkansen has seen additional stations being built over the years, usually 
as a result of local community pressure rather than any particular initiative being taken by the rail 
companies. 
 
One advantage that Japan has over many countries is that due to its shape, much of the population 
lives on the eastern seaboard. As a consequence a single line can link many of the major cities. Such 
a line would not be possible in the UK. However, British lines have perhaps over-concentrated on 
linking terminals while also keeping the construction costs to a minimum. A new high speed line 
could have better coverage – which of course would mean greater use (and profitability). The best 
example is perhaps the East Coast mainline between London and Newcastle. At present it goes via 
towns such as Stevenage, Peterborough, Grantham and Doncaster. A faster service could easily go 
via larger cities such as Leicester, Nottingham, Sheffield and Leeds and still cut the time between 
London and Newcastle. This idea can be seen in Japan also, where the planned route for a possible 
linear shinkansen will make a major detour north to Matsumoto rather than taking the most direct 
route between Tokyo and Nagoya. With trains travelling at up to 500kph, this added distance is 
relatively insignificant and will still mean the Tokyo-Osaka journey could be completed in an hour! 
At present the decision as to whether the line will be built has not been made and further studies into 
improving the trains efficiency, reducing costs (monetary and environmental) are still being made. 
Ultimately the line will need major financial backing from the government and the present economic 
climate is such that the government may not be prepared to take such a step. Furthermore, there are 
no strong/influential politicians in Matsumoto, Nagoya or Nara – which would all be on the route – 
pushing for its early introduction. 
 
 
Problems with the Shinkansen 
 
The cost of the shinkansen is, of course, one of the major concerns with the system. Such huge 
investment is becoming increasingly unimaginable now. Britain, in particular, would need a change 
of thinking before a high-speed network could be introduced. Railways do not offer the same quick 
returns as many other investments – especially when British companies (and the government) have 
proven to be slow at making decisions, coming forward with investment, and actually getting lines 
built (for example, the Channel Tunnel Rail Link).
8
 
 
Although there is still a huge dark cloud of debt hanging over the railway companies in Japan, it is 
not the shinkansen that is responsible for this. The Tōkaidō line began to break-even after only two 
years (Semmens 2000: 19), although the other lines haven taken longer. Much of the debt is due to 
the poor way in which JNR was run – particularly during the 1970s, when the ticket prices were 
continually pushed up, well ahead of inflation, which further discouraged usage of JNR services 
(particularly when alternatives – such as private railway lines running the same route at sometimes 
half the ticket price – were available). Make no mistake, JNR, for much of its history, was not well 
run. In the modern era it is unlikely that such problems would occur again in Japan nor would be 
repeated in a country such as Britain. Developing a high-speed network may be expensive, but it can 
be profitable. However, government assistance is essential. Even with the Tōhoku extension to 
Hachinohe, a system has had to be established whereby the track is leased to JR East, which will 
eventually own the line once the construction and other costs have been met (Semmens 2000: 69). 
 
There are other areas that could also be improved. The incident in August 1993 mentioned above is a 
good example. Following the disruption all trains came to a stop. It was around eight hours before 
the first train got to Nagoya and continued to Osaka. No other trains operated during that time 
between Nagoya and Osaka. Yet there was rolling stock available, which could have provided a 
                                                        
8 For further information see Harris and Godward 1992. 
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shuttle service between these two large cities. In late 2000 a severe typhoon brought the shinkansen 
to a stop near Nagoya. Passengers were stranded on one train for some 18 hours. Then when a train 
broke down on the Tōhoku shinkansen in July 2001, passengers were trapped on a hot day (the 
train’s electricity was not operating so there was no air-conditioning) for several hours. All of these 
incidents would suggest that there is an inability to deal with a crisis – something for which Japan is 
renowned following the 1985 JAL crash, the Great Hanshin Earthquake and the Tōkaimura nuclear 
accident.  
 
Another concern – in some ways linked to the above – is the way of thinking that can develop in 
companies that place so much importance on the ways of doing things and certain rules. Perhaps the 
best example of this occurred in January 2001 when the driver of one shinkansen was questioned 
after his train arrived at Tokyo station from Tokyo sidings over a minute late. It transpired, after he 
gave a false story originally, that he had left the cab – while the train was running – to go back to a 
sink in another carriage where he had left his cap, considered to be an important part of the uniform, 
when he washed his face before starting the journey.
9
 Although there was no danger of an accident, 
due to the system outlined earlier in this paper, it is still worrying that the driver’s appearance was 
considered so important. 
 
As unlikely as it may seem, there are areas which I believe Britain could help Japan to improve the 
shinkansen further. First, with the exception of some of the shinkansen on the northern lines, there is 
little or no room for luggage on the shinkansen. For the most part, passengers appear to be expected 
to be businessmen and for the most part this is true. However, if the shinkansen is to help boost 
domestic travel (which is considered by many as vital for improving the economy), then the interior 
design of many of the shinkansen (as well as other trains) should be reconsidered. 
 
On top of this the provision of smoking carriages and areas should be looked at again. At present for 
some non-smokers it is necessary to walk through the smoking area on the platform and then 
smoking carriages on the train if they need to access another part of the train. In Britain smoking 
cars are placed at the ends of the trains, which overcomes this problem, and on some services (for 
example the Great Western service between London and South Wales) smoking has been prohibited 
altogether. 
 
In one other area, namely seat reservations, the two countries have things to learn from each other 
and could ultimately design a better system. Seat reservations are free in Britain – which can lead to 
them being made, but not used, which only becomes apparent after the train has left the station and 
may have caused inconvenience to other users trying to find a seat. Japan gets around this latter 
problem by allocating some carriages for those with seat reservations and others for those without. 
However, this can lead to a situation where certain carriages become filled to capacity, while others 
remain relatively empty. Whereas Britain can get around this system, with reservations having to be 
made before a train departs from its place of origin, it makes reservations inconvenient. With 
modern technology it must now be possible for a better system to be developed. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
There can be no doubt the shinkansen is a great system and that it works well. It is not perfect and it 
may not be as good as some believe it to be, but I doubt that there is any better system in the world. 
Countries, such as Britain, that aspire to improve their high speed railways should not be afraid to 
look to Japan and to aspire to such services. Indeed, at a time when public confidence in the railways 
in Britain is so low, the operators in Britain may be able to draw some comfort from JNR’s history 
and how the shinkansen was born out of such a situation. However, there is no quick fix. There is 
also no cheap fix. Having said this, the expense of either improving a line or creating new ones may 
                                                        
9 Information taken from a variety of news reports. 
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not be as great as many believe. But it will need government support. The cost of building a new 
system should also be seen in the context of reducing the environmental costs of more people using 
cars and the costs to British industry of time lost due to train delays and cancellations. As Harris 
(1992: 133) points out, when British Rail was carrying 746 million passengers a year, the average 
delay was estimated to be 2.81 minutes, and this accounted for nearly 400 passenger years! 
 
Back in 1997 Japanese public confidence was at a low following the collapse of Yamaichi securities 
and the continued economic problems Japan was facing. At the same time JR Tōkai launched an 
advertising campaign with the slogan ‘Nippon-ni, Nozomi ari’ using a pun on the word ‘Nozomi’, 
meaning either ‘hope’ or the Nozomi service of shinkansen, so the phrase read either ‘In Japan, we 
have hope’ or ‘In Japan, we have the Nozomi’. Furthermore, the shinkansen service itself was 
originally known as ‘yume no chōtokkyū’ (‘the super limited express of dreams’). In Britain there is 
a dream for our train services to improve. Hope that this may become a reality, is perhaps limited. 
But if Britain is to get a true high speed railway on track, then it is time to look to the shinkansen as 
the teacher. 
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